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1. INTRODUCTION
As consumer tastes and production techniques evolve over time, the econ-
omy must adjust to the changing circumstances. It must reallocate its resources
away from less desirable goods and less productive technologies towards newly
desirable and productive ones. The economics of adjustment takes as its subject
matter the analysis of the manner in which these changes occur. It studies how
individual economic agents decide to reallocate resources in response to economic
disturbances and how markets aggregate these individual adjustment decisions.
The importance of the subject arises from the fact that matching resources to
their appropriate uses is a very difficult, costly and time-consuming process. As a
result it is possible that resources may remain misallocated for some time as the
process of adjustment works itself out.
In this paper we focus on the role of information in the adjustment process. In
most situations agents make their adjustment decisions under great uncertainty.
They need to know the best use for their resources, the best location to adjust
to, and the best means of adjustment. They face difficulties, however, in decid-
ing exactly which uses, locations, and means are the best. At each stage of this
decision making process they need to gather information in order to make their
decisions effectively. Faced with such uncertainty, it is natural that agents will
make use of all sources of information at their disposal, including the observed
behavior of others who are in similar situations and contemplating similar adjust-
ment decisions. We argue that a careful consideration of the role that information
plays, especially the process of learning from others, is crucial to understanding
the nature of the adjustment process. A consideration of this role quickly leads
to a class of information externalities that have not been incorporated into the
adjustment literature.
The economics of adjustment is a broad area that covers a wide variety of
different problems. Milton Friedman's original definition of the natural rate places
unemployment in this class of economic problems.
"The natural rate of unemployment," he wrote in his presidential address, " . . . is the level that would be
ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there is imbedded in them
the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, including market imperfections,
stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor
availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on."
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Friedman's definition stresses the frictions inherent in labor markets and the dif-
ficulty of reallocating labor in response to shocks. The natural rate of unemploy-
ment is positive because stochastic supplies and demands make it necessary for
labor to adjust, because it is costly to transfer resources from one use to another,
and because it takes time to gather information concerning how labor should best
be employed.
Labor is not the only factor which faces adjustment problems. Many of the
same problems plague markets for other factors such as land and capital. Office
buildings frequently remain vacant as owners look for desirable tenants. Home
owners often spend months searching for buyers for their homes. Producers must
decide when to open and close factories and where to locate new production. In
each of these cases the need to adjust to changing economic circumstances causes
resources to be temporarily misallocated due to the cost and effort inherent in
finding better uses.
At a broader level, there are times when the entire economy faces an ad-
justment problem. A prime example of this is the situation faced by the nations
of Eastern Europe where resources must adapt to an entirely new political, eco-
nomic, social and legal system. Here the uncertainty surrounding the adjustment
process is particularly acute; no-one has a very clear picture of what the ultimate
deployment of resources in these economies will look like. Similarly, one may view
a developing economy as facing an adjustment problem. Developing nations must
cope with many levels of uncertainty in deciding how to concentrate their resources
in their development effort. In this sense, the economics of transition, growth and
development share much in common with the economics of adjustment.
Returning to the theme of unemployment, much of the Keynesian tradition in
macroeconomics builds upon the idea that adjustment problems, including prob-
lems of coordination and price stickiness, can cause unemployment to remain sub-
optimally high for a long period of time. When and how such high levels of
unemployment might arise and whether or not government action might ease the
adjustment process are all issues that can be included under the general heading
of the economics of adjustment.
As the above examples indicate, there is a vast range of economic issues
that are all aspects of the economics of adjustment. We begin our discussion
of these issues by describing existing approaches that economists use to study
adjustment problems. Much of this effort has focused on the question of why
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it might be optimal for resources to be temporarily unemployed and on whether
or not markets achieve the optimal rate of reallocation. After outlining existing
approaches, we argue that this literature has paid inadequate attention to the
informational problems that are involved in the adjustment process.
2. CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE ECONOMICS OF ADJUSTMENT
The literature on economic adjustment has taken two general approaches to-
wards examining the problems involved in reallocating resources. The search the-
oretic approach emphasizes the difficulties involved in locating appropriate uses
for resources, whereas the adjustment cost approach highlights the costs inherent
in transferring resources from one use to another. In their simplest form, both ap-
proaches explain why it is optimal for a certain fraction of the economy's resources
to remain in what otherwise might appear to be suboptimal uses.
A benchmark model of labor misallocation due to adjustment costs would
begin with a worker who after a shock to the economy is located in state A
when the worker's optimal state of employment is state B. Depending on the
focus of the model, these states may represent unemployment and employment,
different industries or geographical regions, or some other aspect of the economic
environment that might be relevant to the worker's productivity. The model would
then posit: (1) an adjustment cost function that specified how costly it would be
for the worker to move from A to B or, if relevant, to some intermediate position;
and (2) a loss function that specified how costly it would be for the worker to
remain in state A or move only part of the way towards state B. Given the
description of the state space, the adjustment cost function, and the loss function,
it is then straightforward to determine the worker's optimal adjustment policy;
this policy will simply weigh appropriately the costs and benefits of adjustment.
If the costs of moving all of the way to state A exceed the benefits, the worker
will optimally remain suboptimally employed. Yet because there is no inherent
reason that the privately perceived gains and losses should differ from the social
ones, the misallocation that arises out of this benchmark adjustment cost model,
however regrettable, is optimal from a social perspective. This basic model has
been extended to situations in which the states A and B change over time, and
to situations in which these changes are stochastic. These extensions affect the
optimal adjustment policy but not the fact that this policy is socially optimal.
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The questions addressed in adjustment cost models are when to adjust and by-
how much to adjust, not where to adjust. While many extensions of the benchmark
model introduce uncertainty about the future state of the economy, adjustment
cost models rarely consider uncertainty about the economy's current state. Agents
in these models know exactly where resources would move if adjustment were
costless. The adjustment costs merely impede this desired reallocation.
Search models introduce a degree of realism by allowing for situations in which
workers do not know exactly where the best jobs are located. In the benchmark
search model, a worker knows the distribution of wages in the economy, but not the
location of any particular wage offer. Meeting a potential employer is equivalent to
drawing a wage from this distribution. The question facing the searcher is whether
to accept a given wage offer or to continue to search for a better one. The optimal
policy involves calculating the wage that makes the searcher indifferent between
the two alternatives and accepting all offers in excess of this reservation wage.
Like adjustment cost models, search models explain why workers might choose
to remain unemployed. If the gain to finding better employment in the future
exceeds the cost of remaining unemployed today, then search is optimal. Also like
adjustment cost models, there is no intrinsic reason why search should lead to
inefficiency. To the extent that private agents correctly judge the nature of the
tradeoffs involved, their decisions should be optimal from both an individual and
social perspective.
In reaction to the optimality of the benchmark models described above, sev-
eral authors have introduced externalities into the adjustment process. Mussa
(1986) catalogues the possible distortions that might affect adjustment cost mod-
els. He discusses taxes, credit constraints, minimum wage laws, and monopoly
power. The exercise, however, does not present a clear picture of the optimality
of market based adjustment. Depending on how the distortions affect the relative
costs and benefits of adjustment, they may either excessively promote or hinder
the process of reallocation. Mussa concludes, "There is no presumption that the
pace of adjustment...is too rapid or too slow."
Others have considered the role of externalities in search models. Here two
externalities have been emphasized in the literature. First, Mortensen (1982)
observes that any match will result in a situation of bilateral monopoly in which
the worker and the firm bargain over the surplus of the match. To the extent
that this surplus is divided among the two parties, a party that rejects a match
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in favor of continued search does not take into account that part of the surplus
that would accrue to the other party. In this sense search is inefficient as too few
matches are accepted. The second class of externalities concerns the technology
by which workers and firms find matches. Tobin (1972) argues that congestion
effects will cause the equilibrium rate of search unemployment to be inefficiently
high. Gavin (1992) uses similar logic to argue that the unemployment resulting
from adjustment in Eastern Europe is inefficient. Diamond (1982), however, argues
that thick market externalities may lead to the opposite conclusion: an inefficiently
high level of search unemployment. In the Diamond model, higher unemployment
thickens the market and improves the quality of matches. Again, as in adjustment
cost models, there is no presumption that the pace of adjustment is too slow,
rather than too fast.
In broad terms, the existing approaches to the economics of adjustment sur-
veyed above place emphasis on the nature of the costs of adjustment, and the time
it takes for individual agents to sample enough information to determine where
to move. While both of these issues are undoubtedly important, we feel that
current approaches have neglected an important source of external effects on the
search process: externalities that arise in the process of gathering and processing
information.
We believe that learning is one of the central issues in adjustment. Agents
face a tremendous amount of uncertainty in making their adjustment decisions.
Their first task is to gather information in order to make informed decisions. The
existing literature takes a very narrow view of this learning process. In as much
as learning has been studied, it has been viewed as a private affair. An individual
searches against a fixed distribution of offers in a manner that does not interact
directly with the learning of other market participants. Yet others' actions and
behavior may prove to be an important source of knowledge and experience. We
believe that the extent to which one agent may learn from observing the behavior
of other agents has important implications for the adjustment process.
In the next section we argue by example that there are important lessons that
agents learn from watching the behavior of other agents. After presenting these
examples, we describe in the following section, how these externalities alter the
qualitative nature of the adjustment process.
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3. T H R E E STORIES AND A GENERAL APPROACH
The informational issues involved in adjustment can best be appreciated by-
considering actual situations. We therefore begin with three cases in which re-
sources are currently known to be in sub-optimal uses, and discuss how the owner
of the resource can go about learning the appropriate use of the resource.
The Case of the Vacant Office Buildings
As our first case, consider a world in which there are a large number of cur-
rently unoccupied buildings in a given area, each with a separate owner. Owners
show potential tenants their vacant office space and entertain offers to take oc-
cupancy. Because it is costly to commit the building to any one of its potential
uses, owners will not make a commitment easily. They will weigh the current
offer against the possibility of receiving a better offer in the future. The situation
is similar to the benchmark search model except that we have a group of offices
instead of only one.
In the standard search theoretic view, there is a fixed distribution of valuations
among the potential tenants, and this makes it a straightforward matter for the
owner to decide on the cutoff for accepting an offer. There are many situations,
however, in which it is far from straightforward for either the landlord or the
potential tenants to work out how they are to value the office space. The reason
for this is that uncertainty has many dimensions. For example, owners need to
ensure that rent is paid. For this they need to know if this particular tenant is
creditworthy, and they need to form expectations regarding the potential success
of the tenant's business. Will this tenant be successful in the future and therefore
able to pay higher rents, or will the tenant file for bankruptcy leaving the owner
in need of a new occupant for the office? Other issues arise from the fact that
signing on a particular tenant commits the property to a particular use. This
raises questions concerning the appropriate use for the property. What lines of
business are likely to thrive in the coming years? What sort of business will occupy
neighboring buildings? What sorts of synergies will these businesses create, and
what sorts of tenants would be willing to pay higher rents to take advantage of
these external economies?
The important point here is not that information is complex or multifaceted.
Such complications can be handled within the context of the benchmark search
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model by allowing agents to search against a more general class of distributions.
The important point is that with potentially so much uncertainty from so many
different sources, agents can be expected to use all of the information at their
disposal to inform their choices. In particular, when there are several property
owners in a similar situation searching for tenants, there is the possibility that
each may learn from the others.
The uncertainty surrounding many of the questions raised above can be
greatly reduced by such observation. An owner can obtain a guess as to the
creditworthiness or reliability of a prospective tenant by observing the behavior of
other tenants with similar characteristics. An owner can gain some information on
the relative merits of various uses for the property by observing the choices that
others make. Similarly, an owner can gain information as to the future character
of a neighborhood by watching what other owners do with their property.
What emerges is the picture of a market in which everyone is watching ev-
eryone else, deciphering each others every move, attempting to learn what they
can about the market. If one owner mothballs a building waiting for business
conditions to improve, than all will become slightly more pessimistic about the
current situation. If one building is rented for an unexpectedly large amount than
all infer that the value of their real estate has risen. If one owner decides to rent
to a firm in a particular industry, than all take a close look at the advantages of
letting to a similar firm.
These sorts of information spillovers occur all the time. An example, although
not from real estate, concerns the sale of the Baltimore Orioles baseball club. Upon
hearing that the rival club sold for $170 million, an owner of the Boston Red Sox
was quoted as saying that the sale would "have a significant impact on what this
teams [sic] sells for and increase the value of all baseball franchises." "Frankly," he
continued, "I'm surprised the price was that high. I figured it would be somewhere
in the area of $140 [million]."1 From this reaction, it is clear that the Orioles' sale
conveyed positive information that affected the valuation of other clubs.
In another example, Bed, Bath and Beyond, a retailer specializing in linens
and bathroom accessories, recently opened a superstore in a vacant building on
lower Sixth Avenue in New York and was successful in drawing shoppers to the
area. As a result many other buildings were quickly rented to retailers. Rents
1
 Figures and quotes are from McDonough (1993, p. 65).
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in the area rose from the low $20's a square foot that Bed, Bath and Beyond is
paying to nearly $40 per square in negotiations a year later. Following Bed, Bath
and Beyond's success, "the owners of a parking lot on 23rd Street, whose original
plans to build an apartment building on the site were quashed by a combination
of the depressed market and city red tape, are now wondering whether the space
might serve a lucrative commercial use."2 Again the experience of one searcher
appears to have provided valuable information to others trying to make similar
decisions.
The Case of the East European Arms Manufacturer
It is clear that there is currently a tremendous mismatch between the actual
employment of labor and capital in Eastern Europe and their optimal employment.
This has led to a large discussion of the nature of the adjustment mechanism, much
of it focussing on the relative costs and benefits of gradual verses accelerated
adjustment. The picture that is typically painted in these discussions is that of
an economy that is off target, where the main issue is how to adjust to a that
ultimate target. Again, we feel that this misses the crucial issue of just how
agents actually go about assessing the optimal use for resources that are currently
poorly employed.
There are many unanswered questions concerning adjustment in East Europe.
Just how much heavy industry will survive the transition to a market economy?
What will happen to the science establishment, the arms industry, and the nuclear
power industry? To be concrete, consider a plant with a trained work force that is
currently manufacturing arms, but knows that it is about to lose its key contract
with the state. What should it do? Should the factory close, should it produce
arms for export, or should it convert to another use? Once these broad decisions
are made a whole set of subsidiary issues must be addressed. If the factory is to
be closed, can anything be salvaged for scrap? If new orders are to be sought,
which countries are likely to be interested, and how does one tailor products and
market them in that country? If the factory is to be converted, what is the best
product to produce?
Again with such pervasive uncertainty the factory managers will look any-
where for information. One important source will be the experience of other fac-
tories in the local region, and of other arms manufacturers in general. By studying
2
 Quotes and figures are from Deutsch (1993).
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the decisions that others in similar situations have made and are making the man-
agers may indirectly benefit from the information gathered by others prior to their
decisions. They will be able to avoid decisions that turned out to be mistaken and
to emulate those that succeeded.
The Case of the Redundant Steel Workers
One may regard an unemployed worker as facing many of the same issues.
Just as a landlord must find the appropriate tenant and a plant manager must
decide on the appropriate product, unemployed workers must find appropriate
employment. In general, a worker's performance and pay will depend on the
quality of the workers match with a given firm, and this quality will depend in
turn on how well a workers skills fit with the needs of the firm, how well these
skills mesh with those of other workers, how well the worker's personality fits with
those of other workers and so on. Because their pay depends on the quality of the
match, unemployed workers are likely to spend some time searching for a good
match. The search literature has considered this problem to be a private one, one
of a worker searching against a fixed distribution of matches or wage offers and
optimally deciding which ones to accept. The literature on external effects has
merely added the effect of one worker's search on the arrival rate of matches for
others.
The questions facing unemployed workers are of course much broader than
whether a given wage is greater than the reservation wage. Workers must decide
where even to begin looking for a firm to match with. They must decide whether
to remain in their current line of work or search for employment in another field.
If switching fields appears to be the best policy, workers must decide which ones
offer the best prospects for employment for a worker of their type, and which firms
within those particular fields present the best prospects for long and prosperous
matches.
It is clear that if any of the characteristics that add to the success of a match
between a particular type of firm and a particular type of worker are publicly
observable then workers and firms should use this knowledge to improve their
chances of making successful matches. By observing the behavior of workers with
similar skills and characteristics a worker can learn which types of firms value
workers with characteristics similar to his or her own.
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Because firms tend to hire workers that match well with the firm, and because
workers with the same firm tend to acquire similar skills and knowledge, workers
will not have to look far to find other workers with similar characteristics whose
behavior they might find informative. An unemployed steel worker will tend to
observe the behavior of other unemployed steel workers, since these people are
likely to share many of the same skills, educational achievement, and social at-
titudes. Are these other workers remaining in town waiting to be called back to
their jobs? Are they taking other jobs? What type of jobs? Are they happy?
Are they moving away? Where are they moving? Are they finding work in their
new locations? The answers to these questions will influence where and with what
intensity the steel worker searches for new employment.
In all three examples, there is a tremendous amount of missing information.
As in the standard search model, individuals will take time to gather and process
the information that is relevant to this decision. But unlike the standard search
model, information is an incredibly complex multifaceted object, and there are
multiple sources of information relevant to the optimal use of the resource. In
particular, in all three cases much that is relevant to one individual's decision can
be clarified by watching the decision making processes of other actors. In the case
of the vacant offices, one of the relevant sources of information is the rental history
of neighboring offices. In the case of Eastern European arms manufacturers, one
of the sources of information is the decision of similar arms manufacturers on how
to convert their factories. In the case of the redundant steel workers, there are the
search histories of other workers laid off in steel and allied heavy industries.
4. INFORMATION SPILLOVERS AND OPTIMAL SEARCH
The possibility that agents gain information from the search behavior of other
agents raises questions concerning what exactly it is that agents learn and how it
is that they learn it. In order to understand how informational spillovers influence
the adjustment process, one needs to know what aspects of individual behavior
are observable, what the relevance of these observations is to other market partici-
pants, and how these observations affect the others' search behavior. At a broader
level, one needs to know how these influences on individual behavior affect the
operation of the market as a whole. In general the answers to these questions will
depend both on the source of the uncertainty and the way in which information
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is shared among workers. To get a flavor for the types of interactions that are
possible, we discuss several possible cases in detail. To fix ideas we stay with the
example of unemployed workers searching for new employment.
We begin with a simple case. Suppose that each worker is unsure about some
aspect of the distribution of wage offers, possibly its mean or variance, and that
all workers draw their wages from the same distribution. In this case, it is easy
to see why the offers received by other workers would prove useful; they provide
additional information regarding the unknown aspect of the wage distribution.
Suppose further that there are no problems with information sharing. At the
end of the day, all workers meet and provide complete accounts of their search
activity. In this way, there is a common pool of information that all workers use
in determining their reservation wages.
Even in this simple setting a number of informational externalities are present.
First, as workers weigh the costs and benefits of increasing their search effort, they
will only consider the value to themselves of receiving an additional offer and fail
to take into account the value of this offer to others. For this reason, it is very
likely that there will be too little search from a social standpoint. Information,
as a public good, will be underprovided by the market. Second, the public good
aspect of information leads to a free rider problem. If search is costly and requires
effort, then each worker has an incentive to conserve energy and allow others to
gather information for them. This too will lead to too little search in equilibrium.
Finally, if and when workers do accept job offers they may not take account of
the fact that by accepting an offer they stop searching and this stops the flow of
information to others. Note that this third channel implies that unemployment
spells are suboptimally short because workers accept too many offers, whereas the
first two imply that spells are suboptimally long due to insufficient search effort.
All three, however, imply that there is too little information from a social per-
spective. Ideally, agents should search more and search harder, but a combination
of externalities and free rider problems prevents them from doing so.
One unrealistic aspect of this simple story of information sharing is that the
flow of information between workers stops once a worker has accepted a job. In
many cases the situation is exactly the opposite. Certain aspects of the match
between a worker and a firm are observable only after a worker accepts a job offer
and begins to work. We therefore consider what would happen if instead of learning
about the distribution of wages, workers were learning about the quality of a match
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between their skills and those required by the various types of employment open
to them. To be specific, assume that there are many types of employment and
that ex ante each job has a known and identical distribution of initial wage offers
against which all workers searches. Workers differ in that each possesses a certain
combination of skills and attributes. The sources of uncertainty is that workers do
not know which jobs match well with their particular set of skills, and the quality
of this match will determine future wage growth on the job. For simplicity, we
assume that the quality of the match between a particular worker and a firm is
captured by a single parameter that is observable to the match participants and
the public at large only after a job has been taken.
Since the distribution of initial wage offers is known there is nothing that
workers can learn from the search experience of other workers. Workers can, how-
ever, learn from others' matches. When a worker with certain set of skills discov-
ers a particularly good match, all workers with similar skills will learn something
about their match with that profession.
In this case, the information externality manifests itself in too few matches.
Workers fail to take account of the value to others of the information that accept-
ing a job offer reveals. For this reason unemployment spells will tend to be too
long from a social perspective. As before there is also a free rider problem since
agents have an incentive to wait for others to take jobs and reveal the quality
of their matches. This free rider problem reinforces the effect of the information
externality. It causes searchers to be even more selective in the matches that they
accept. Unemployment spells become even longer, and the shortage of information
even more acute.
In each of these examples, we have assumed that information sharing was a
simple task. In the first case, it was possible to observe the entire search history of
other workers. In the second case, it was possible to perfectly observe the quality of
other workers' matches. In many situations, such information is neither simple to
observe nor easy to convey. Nor is it the case that all information is equally easy to
share. It is quite possible that a worker learns more from the fact that a co-worker
has taken a job than from the observation that this co-worker is still unemployed.
A worker may remain unemployed for a number of reasons. The worker may
have received no offers from employers or the worker may have received only poor
offers or the worker may not even have searched at all. Unless the channels of
communication are very good much of this experience may remain unobservable.
MASS LAYOFFS 13
An accepted job is potentially far more informative. One could learn the industry,
location, and possibly even the wage of the job that was accepted, all of which
may be valuable information to a searcher.
The fact that there is imperfect information sharing among the unemployed
workers has further important ramifications for the search process. Consider a
case in which the distribution of wage offers is uncertain as in the first case above,
but rather than sharing information on wage offers, workers only learn about the
wages that are accepted. In this setting, successful matches between workers and
firms create information that is useful to other workers attempting to decide how
to use their unemployed labor, whereas continued unemployment is an ambiguous
signal for the reasons described above.
The limited sharing of information in this example make the information ex-
ternality and the free rider problem even more clear. To see this it is useful to
compare the incentive to accept a match in this market setting to the benchmark
search model in which each agent searches in isolation. Because matches in the
market setting create information that is valuable to other searchers, social op-
timality dictates that agents should accept jobs more readily than they would if
they were searching in isolation. This is the information externality at work. Due
to the free rider problem, however, the result is precisely the opposite; workers
become more selective in the market setting in order to learn from others' matches.
As a result the market produces individual spells of unemployment that are un-
ambiguously longer than would be socially optimal because each individual delays
acceptance in order to learn what others have done.
These examples illustrate possible ways in which the consideration of informa-
tion spillovers may enrich our understanding of economic adjustment, and there-
fore of the natural rate of unemployment. One general feature in all of the above
cases is a tendency toward the underprovision of information by the private market.
This shortage of information affects the efficiency of the search process and pro-
vides a possible role for government policy to improve the allocation of resources.
Whether this shortage of information leads to a natural rate of unemployment
that is above or below its optimal level, however, remains an open question that
can only be resolved by analyzing formal models of informational spillovers.
In this paper we have argued that many topics in economics, including the
theory of the natural rate of unemployment, can be viewed as part of the broader
theory of the economics of adjustment. We have argued that existing approaches
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to the economics of adjustment take a very narrow view of the role of information.
We have outlined an approach to this topic that stresses the role of learning and
information externalities, and discussed through examples how these concerns alter
the qualitative nature of the adjustment process. In particular, there appears
to be a general bias towards the underprovision of information. The economic
significance of this underprovision of information will likely vary from market to
market.
INFORMATION AND ADJUSTMENT 15
5. REFERENCES
DEUTSCH, CLAUDIA (1993): "From the Carriage Trade to the Catagory Killers, " New
York Times, New York, NY, July 27, 1993.
DIAMOND, PETER (1981): "Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency,"
Journal of Political Economy 89, 798-812.
GAVIN, MICHAEL (1993): "Unemployment and the Economics of Gradualist Policy Re-
form, " mimio., Columbia University.
FRIEDMAN, MILTON (1968): "The Role of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review
56, 1-17.
MCDONOUGH, WILL (1993): "In the Long Run, Oriole Sale Could Pay Off for Red Sox,
" Boston Globe, Boston, MA., August 7, 1993, p.65-67.
MORTENSEN, DALE (1982): "The Matching Process as a Non-Cooperative Bargaining
Game, " in J. McCall, ed., The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
MUSSA, MICHAEL (1986): "The Adjustment Process and the Timing of Trade Liberal-
ization, " in Choksi and Papageorgiou, eds., Economic Liberalization in Developing
Countries, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 68-124.
TOBIN, JAMES (1972): "Inflation and Unemployment," American Economic Review 60,
1-18.
